Without security nothing else will last." The security line of operations must be buttressed by attempts to win the trust of the populace and enhance the legitimacy of the counterinsurgents. As John Paul Vann, an American adviser in Vietnam, said, "Security may be ten percent of the problem, or it may be ninety percent, but whatever it is, it's the first ten percent or the first ninety percent. Securing the population is thus the most important line of operations. Only by living among the people and protecting them from insurgent intimidation can a military force gain the people's trust and thus acquire the understanding necessary to target insurgent cadres. Some of that intelligence can be acquired by technical means, but there is no substitute for the situational awareness provided by security forces (whether American or host-nation) who are in daily contact with the population.
The basis of successful counterinsurgency is acquiring intelligence to identify an enemy that often hides in plain sight. Insurgents, in fact, count on security forces to over-react and thereby to drive more recruits into their ranks. But, while the aggressive pursuit of insurgent forces is necessary, it is insufficient to achieve victory-and if undertaken in indiscriminate fashion can actually backfire by creating more insurgents than you capture or kill. International organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the news media are also likely to be present on the battlefield, and the successful commander must interact with them constructively, and if possible use them to achieve campaign objectives, even though they are outside the military chain of command.Ĭombined-arms operations will be required to route insurgents out of their strongholds and to provide security against their incursions into population centers. Successfully countering an insurgency will require commanders to skillfully synchronize multiple lines of operations, acting in concert with host-nation forces as well as representatives of other U.S. Most insurgencies utilize a combination of guerrilla and terrorist tactics-the former are hit-and-run attacks directed primarily at government security forces, the latter are attacks directed primarily against civilians-supported by propaganda and political organizing. Insurgencies typically have political or religious motivation but criminal gangs can also become powerful enough to imperil a state's authority.
An insurgency is an organized uprising that uses violent and nonviolent means to overthrow an existing government or to wrest away control, either de jure or de facto, over part of its territory. "The shooting side of the business is only 25% of the trouble and other 75% lies in getting the people of the country behind us."Ĭounterinsurgency is the use of all elements of a nation's power-including not only combined-arms operations but also psychological, political, economic, intelligence, and diplomatic operations-to defeat an insurgency. "Irregular warfare is far more intellectual than a bayonet charge." For all these reasons irregular warfare will continue to be prevalent. Moreover the conditions for the growth of insurgency-chiefly a lack of effective governance-exist in many areas of the world, especially in Central Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and parts of Latin America and Southeast Asia. Our enemies study, and are inspired by, the examples of Vietnam, Beirut (1983), Somalia (1993), Iraq, Afghanistan and other conflicts where irregular forces have inflicted significant setbacks and even defeats on American forces. Irregular-warfare tactics, on the other hand, have shown a far higher likelihood of success against American military forces. armed forces with conventional forces in the open field is tantamount to suicide-as Saddam Hussein discovered for himself. America's enemies understand that to fight the U.S. Irregular warfare has been ubiquitous throughout history and is more important than ever today, at a time when conventional warfare is growing increasingly rare. Irregular warfare is the oldest form of warfare-it long predates the rise of conventional armies in ancient Mesopotamia around 3000 BC. forces in Afghanistan, the era of counterinsurgency is far from over. forces have left Iraq and there is a planned reduction in U.S. Why Does COIN Matter to Maneuver Leaders?Įven though U.S.